CaitlinLM

By 1934, the situation for the Communists had become extremely difficult under Chiang Kaishek’s ‘Blockhouse Strategy’, which had so far succeeded in its attempt to starve the Jiangxi Soviet of Resources. It was apparent that the situation was only to become more complicated, so Red Army commander in chief Zhu De, leading member of the Bolshevik group Bo Gu, Zhou Enlai, and the Comintern agent Otto Braun all came to the joint decision that they should evacuate the province, and attempt to break through the blockade. However, the CCP would only achieve success if they induced an element of surprise in the GMD – and therefore, much emphasis was placed on the plan’s secrecy. The march was initiated when news of Chiang Kaishek’s alleged offensive plan were revealed. The southwest corner of the blockade was reported as the weakest point of the encirclement – and therefore, in September, the Communist troops exited via this region. In preparation for the escape, food, ammunition, clothing and medical supplies had to be collected, CCP documents were destroyed, and personnel were categorised into those that would join the march; and those that would remain. The withdrawal strategy was coordinated by Zhou Enlai; whilst the sets of corps were led by Lin Biao and Peng Dehuai. Each set was equipped with only 9000 rifles, 2 field guns, 30 light mortars firing homemade shells, and 300 machine guns. Furthermore, the personnel were divided into two columns; the ‘Command Column’ with Central Committee members, intelligence staff, cadets, and a small anti-aircraft unit, followed by the ‘Support Column’ with more party and government personnel and some machinery for constructing simple ammunition. Despite many participating in the march, many were also forced to remain in the Jiangxi Soviet. Amongst these select few were the majority of women and Children, who were forced to stay and endure the suffering induced by the GMD’s recapture of the area. Furthermore, 28 000 Communist troops, including 20 000 wounded, were forced to sacrifice the march. The official break-out occurred during the night of October 16, 1934. It was overall, a strategic victory, with much of the Communist force reaching Shaanxi province on October 20, 1935, after trekking across almost 6000 miles of hazardous country. Initially, the plan was extremely successful – with the two leading army corps crossing the southwest perimeter of the blockade, crossing the Tao River and moving to the northern region of the Guangdong province. However, as Peng Duhuai led the Third Corps through the second defensive line, his army suffered severe casualties. With the GMD closely pursuing the Communists, Zhou’s army adopted a ‘march four hours, rest four hours’ policy’ – and subsequently, managed to combat the third defense line on the Wuhan-Canton railroad. The army successfully broke through the final defense line, along the Xiang River, in mid-December. Yet their success can only be attributed to the restocking of supplies from Guizhou market towns. Whilst resting in Zunyi, party leaders continued previous campaigns, organised mass meetings, discussed land reform, and distributed goods to the poor. In the aftermath of the Zunyi Conference, Mao overtook military leadership, and continued the army’s march, through northern Guizhou, Yunnan, and southern Sichuan. Once reaching the northern Sichuan town of Mougong on June 12, 1935, the Red Army's original number had been halved to 40 000. It was in this province that Mao joined forces with Zhang Guotao, divided, and then continued to lead the army across the bleak marshlands of the Qinghai-Gansu border. The conditions were harsh and for some, fatal. As a consequence, when Mao's troops joined the Shaanxi Communist Guerrilla forces at Wuqizhen, it was found that approximately 8000 or 9000 of the original 80 000 troops had survived the duration of the trek.
 * The Long March **

Overall, it is fair to claim that the Long March would not have occurred if Jiangxi Soviet leadership had taken the approach of a ‘mobile war’, rather than one characterised by ‘pure defense'. In fact, the experience can only be appropriately summarised through Mao's perspective, where he writes, "The Long March is the first of its kind in the annals of History. It is a manifesto, a propaganda force, a seeding machine...It has proclaimed to the world that the Red Army is an army of heroes, while the imperialists and their running dogs, Dhiang Kai-shek and his like, are impotent". Although the CCP managed to achieve their aim in escaping the Jiangxi Soviet, they had lost almost the entire structure of southern and eastern bases; both urban and rural - and this proved almost fifteen years of endeavour to be futile.