CaitlinPL

Chiang Kaishek implemented the policy of people’s livelihood to a considerable extent during the period 1928-1937, yet overall, his plans failed to reach their full potential. //**great start - balanced yet answers the question**//
 * To what extent did Chiang Kaishek implement the policy of People's Livelihood as outlined by Sun Yatsen in the period 1928 to 1937? **

Initially, the government was very proactive in their attempt to overhaul the economic, industrial and social aspects of China, embracing the opportunity to ‘accept responsibility for providing food, clothing, shelter and transport’ as Sun Yatsen’s vision outlined. Yet according to Chiang, aspirations of a revolutionised, efficient government equated to the abolition of democracy. The policy targeted a number of key areas, most notable including industrial developments, where transport and infrastructure were extended and modernised; economic developments, where new banks were established and currency was nationalized; and social developments, where education was improved and coordinated. However, the quest to execute such objectives also brought major financial problems, economic ineptitude and a method of living where the nation’s people became an unproductive and poverty-stricken mass. The aforementioned notion will be discussed with reference to historical fact. The most significant facet of Chinese living which Chiang Kaishek’s policy targeted was industrial and transportation development. Initially, these methods of improvement were carried out successfully, yet as time surpassed, it became clear that most of these attempts were unnecessary, even forcing the nation into a life of redundancy. For instance, the Guangzhou-Hankou railway was completed in 1936, and between the period of 1928-1937 it expanded from 8000 to 13 000 kilometres. In addition, 1000 kilometres of sealed highway in 1921 were increased to 115 703 kilometres by 1936. Despite this, these infrastructure improvements were only designed for military use, and hence did little to stimulate the Chinese economy. Furthermore revealing this sense of inadequacy is China’s method of industrial equipment importation. These imports were worth 500 million Yuan, and subsequently, provided a solid industrial base which created the potential for future expansion. Subsequently, China’s industrial production grew at the annual rate of six per cent and appeared to set a firm financial foundation. However, upon closer inspection, it was clear that most of this modern industry was concentrated in coastal cities, and as a consequence, was financed largely by foreign capital. In fact, when products such as coal and iron were exported they only provided a high return for foreign capitalism, and once again, contributed little to the stimulation of the domestic economy. Thus, it is quite apparent that Chiang Kaishek’s intentions for China’s industrial development were positive, yet the practical manner of his plans failed.

Another notable component of Chiang Kaishek’s policy was his attempt to economically overhaul the nation. Finances were improved, with the traditional silver tael being replaced by a standard silver dollar, in 1933. In addition, four major banks were organised; the ‘Central Bank’ which was in charge of currency stability, the ‘Bank of China’ concerned with foreign exchange, ‘Farmers Bank’ involved with land mortgages, and ‘the Bank of Communication’ which dealt with domestic industry. All of these banks issued a standard paper currency, known as ‘fa-pi’. This initially generated a sense of financial independence and economic stability for China, however soon metamorphosed into a nation beset by major financial problems. The absence of income tax resulted in the governmental reliance on custom and consumption taxes, a notion highly indicative of China’s failure to balance its budget. In fact, in 1931, 87 per cent of the budget was spent on the army, and as a result the government printed more money. However, this unleashed enormous inflation, with the negative repercussions impacting most prominently on the poor. Therefore, it is evident that Chiang Kaishek attempted to implement a number of techniques to invigorate the financial status of the nation, yet these plans failed and resulted in economic ineptitude.

The third constituent of the nation’s foundation which Chiang Kaishek attempted to revolutionise was social development. Most notable were his efforts to modernise and co-ordinate the education system. The Nationalist government considered education as the central policy for national unity, and thus greatly endeavoured to improve its overall conduction and efficiency. The national language was made compulsory and an administrative organisation was created to ensure a common curriculum was enforced. School enrolments increased dramatically, particularly during 1935 to 1937 where enrolments rose from 13 million to 23 million. Despite this, educational institutions were distributed unevenly and thus encouraged opportunity for intellectual inequality. For instance, of the 103 tertiary institutions available, 32 were in Beiping and Shanghai while all the others were in major urban centres. Furthermore revealing this inequality is the number of educational places offered within particular districts. For example, In Shanghai there were 213 secondary places for 10 000 people, while in the more remote province of Shanxi there were only 4 places for every 10 000 people. The education system, despite offering opportunity for improved intellect, generated a mass of people lacking knowledge about the most significant and relevant subjects. For instance, a study of Chinese studying in the United States revealed that only 3.5 per cent of students between the years 1905 and 1954 studied agricultural science. This was an abysmal statistic when one considered that more than 80 per cent of China’s people lived within rural regions. The foreign content of the curriculum produced a nation of knowledgeable citizens, yet ones inept in governing their own country. Clearly, Chiang Kaishek implemented a number of educational developments, yet these became redundant as their irrelevance was initially overlooked.

In conclusion, one can undoubtedly deduce that Chiang Kaishek was proactive in implementing some degree of national improvement, yet the practical execution of these plans was irrelevant, unnecessary and even redundant. His policy may deserve esteemed recognition in regards to industrial developments, where transport and infrastructure were extended and modernised; economic developments, where new banks were established and currency was nationalised; and social developments, where education was improved and coordinated. However, overall the quest to execute such objectives was completed in a manner damaging to the nation’s welfare. One must contemplate as to why such a pattern of detrimental circumstances occurred – Was it due to Chiang’s political greed, overestimation of economic resources or simple negligence when asserting authority over a nation’s conduct?


 * //This is an impressive and sophisticated essay. Your paragraphing and ability to integrate complexity concisely is excellent. It is however, somewhat shorter than would require a comprehensive response. Would you mind if I showed this one to the class?//**