LauraPL

To what extent did Chiang Kai-shek implement the Principles of People’s Livelihood in the period 1928-1937? At first sight, Chiang and the nationalist government appeared to have achieved great success through the implementation of Sun Yat Sens policy of the Principal of People’s Livelihood, however this inconsequential attempt became somewhat vague due to the fundamental problems within the nation. Despite this, Sun was clear that the revolutionary government were obliged to accept responsibility for providing clothing, shelter, food and transport to the eighty percent of Chinese peasantry in dire search for such equally sought out resources. Regardless of the considerable amount of progress being made, it was to be understood that Sun’s principal of democracy ha been shunned. Chiang was seen to be moving closer to a dictatorship as he prolonged the period of tutelage to further delay the introduction of parliamentary government. It came to be understood that Chiang and his party were not at all devout to implementing Sun’s Principal of People’s Livelihood, rather they possessed other motives for conducting economic change. Due to their rising interest with the fascist government they slowly began to move away from all three of Sun’s principals.

Chiang and the nationalist party applied a great deal into the development and implementation of infrastructure to service a modernizing state, however, the plans were firstly designed for military use. The plans did little to stimulate the economy, further enhancing the notion of the Chiang and the party possessing other motives. The Guangzhou-Hankou railway was completed din 1936 and between 1928 and 1937 the railway network expanded from 8000 to 13 000 kilometres of track. The second advancement saw 1000 kilometres of sealed highway in 1921, increased to 115 703 kilometres by 1936. Aside from the exterior appearance of economic advancement, the new and developed infrastructure was strongly implemented for military use and improvements.

As the nationalists came into power in 1927, the economy was in grim circumstances. In 1933 the traditional but somewhat unequal silver tael, whose weight and value varied from province to province, was replaced by a standard silver dollar. By 1935, under the guidance of Chiang’s brother-in-law, four major banks were organised, each baring specific responsibilities. In spite of this, financial reforms never addressed the problems of rising revenue. The heavy reliance on deficit budgets eventually lead to inflation, ruining the very people whose support the government depended on- all in all Chiang and the nationalists never succeeded in balancing its budget. In 1931- as military expenses increased rapidly, 87% of the budget was spent on the army. This expenditure again enhances the notion of the nationalists other notions. These financial instabilities did nothing to ensue the policy as it bore most heavily on the peasantry whose taxes inevitably ended up in the possession of the wealthy. During national rule, industrial production grew at the annual rate of six percent. However with closer analysis, the picture was not as encouraging. Modern industry was devoted to the costal cities, in particular- treaty ports, and was financed largely by foreign capital. Factory production and mining never employed more than two million and these sectors produced no more than ten percent on the Gross National Product. The problem was a direct result of lack of consumer demand. It was only until the countryside broke out of its economic stagnation, that issues would improve.

One way that the nationalist government aimed to achieve unity and developed and necessary skills was through education. A centralised educational administration was established to control curriculum and a national language was made compulsory. There was a rise in enrolments from thirteen million to twenty-three million within the nation however; educational opportunities were very unevenly distributed. A maximum of four places for every ten thousand people was offered to the remote provinces of Shanxi, as apposed to an outweighing two hundred and thirteen available positions for every ten thousand people in Shanghai. Due to evident restrictions to rural areas, the secondary enrolment stood at 545 207 in a population of 450 million. A League of Nations report was concerned that China was producing an elite that steered away from the 80 percent of illiterate peasants. It appeared as though such educational opportunities benefited those higher in society and living in urban centres, transforming into an ‘unproductive clique enclosed within the narrow bounds of its own interests’. The educational problems faced were formidable, it is noted that little was done to assist those 70 percent living in rural areas, with educational opportunities.

The nationalist government made serious attempts to increase the productivity of Chinese farms, however, such efforts were affected by lack of money. The government failed to build up an effective advisory system to persuade provincial authorities to take up any improvements. World economic and climatic conditions culminated making the task increasingly more difficult. Simultaneously, the government did not make any attempts to redistribute land amongst the peasantry- this was an essential element of Sun’s principle of people’s livelihood. By 1937 the vast majority of China’s peasantry remained stuck in poverty and ignorance.

The ‘hearts and minds’ of the peasantry was lost as, despite its promises, the Nationalist government had unmistakably turned its back on China’s peasants. Disregarding the fundamental element of Sun’s policy. In 1932, Chiang Kai-shek willingly admitted that ‘ the Chinese government has failed. My only desire today is to restore the revolutionary spirit that the Chinese Kuomintang had in 2924’. The government inevitably lost its original driving force and incentive to reform. Explanations for the unsuccessful implementation on Sun’s policy have said to be due to poor party organisation, the absorption of many conservative members, widespread corruption, inefficient administration, and provincial independence and fear of communism. Whilst Chiang was left attempting to gain further support, Mao Zedong was convincing his party that the future lay in the peasantry and equality. It is through the Chinese expression that the achievements of the Chinese Nationalist government can be summarised and illustrated; ‘strong on the outside, but weak inside’.